Swappable Memories

When Damien first brought forth the idea of memories becoming tradable in the near future, I got a bit sick to my stomach. In contrast to what Leslie mentions, I believe that memory as a commodity would deteriorate the concept of self and individuality. I am a proponent of the idea that we are what we experience, in the sense that our experiences shape our character and how we react to the environment. For example, say one’s mother died when he or she was five years old, the memory of this would probably force this person to take on a paternal role for younger siblings, develop a matured responsibility, and grow up quicker than usual. However, if this person were to swap the memory with another human, the traumatic event could force this person down a contrasting path which seeks drugs and alcohol to deal with the overwhelming pain. Although we may respond differently to such memories, they still shape our individualism.

Also, as Ryan briefly mentioned, I believe that experiencing another’s memory depletes the beauty of living in the moment. When I experience something memorable, such as climbing a 14,000 foot peak in western Colorado, the recollection is loaded with emotion, such as the wonderful smell of pine trees on the way up, the fatigue and suffering of hiking and climbing 14 miles, and the enormous satisfaction of overcoming agony and fear. If this memory was digitally transmitted to the brain of a friend of mine, he would lose some powerful emotion because he would be fully aware that this was not a moment he experienced first hand. Furthermore, trading memories could make us lazier, because we would no longer have to explore things on our own. If someone wanted to become a doctor, he or she could simply download the developed memory of an experienced physician and instantly acquire the skills necessary to operate on a patient. This could be extremely dangerous because society would no longer have to put effort into achieving such goals, ultimately destroying the concept of an aspiration or dream altogether.

However, as Leslie traces, some positives could come from these memory implantations, but the memories would have to be limited and made available only with the consent of the individual who owns the memory. Sure memories could be used to help someone overcome a traumatic event, allow a handicap person to run for the first time, or permit a permanently blind person to experience a beautiful landscape. Unfortunately, in this situation I feel that the negatives outweigh the positives and I fear for the unraveling of such technology in the future.